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In the United States, civil marriage is a fundamental right.1  When people speak of 
marriage, it often brings up pictures of men in tuxedos and women in white dresses standing in 
front of friends and family in a religious building or outside, with a religious officiant declaring 
that the couple is married before God and that, “by the power invested in me by the state of ‘x,’” 
they are married.  In one single moment, they have been united in both religious and civil 
marriage.  The term marriage is used interchangeably to mean the religious union, the civil 
union, or both.  This understanding of marriage is perpetuated in the media and politics.  Given 
the commingled status of religious and civil marriage, this paper suggests that the marriage 
system in the United States is unconstitutional under current Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  
It proposes a system that separates civil and religious marriage.  The major benefit of such a 
system is its constitutionality.2  Furthermore, it opens up possibilities in the same-sex marriage 
debate that are currently foreclosed because of religious commingling with civil marriage.3  
Rather than using the equal protection arguments often employed to argue for same-sex marriage 
rights,4 this paper approaches a solution from an Establishment Clause perspective.   
Part I discusses the current system of marriage in the United States.  Part II evaluates the 
system under current Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Part III examines the German model 
of the separation of civil and religious marriage and proposes making the theoretical separation 
of religious and civil marriage in the United States more concrete.  Part IV analyzes the 
constitutionality of the separation proposal.  And, Part V discusses some of the implications the 
proposed separation would have on the same-sex marriage/Equal Protection arguments. 
                                                 
1 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
2 See discussion infra Part IV. 
3 See discussion infra Part V; see also, Justin T. Wilson, Preservationism, or the Elephant in the Room: How 
Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage Deceive Us Into Establishing Religion, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 561 
(2007) (concluding that “if the Establishment Clause really means what it says, same-sex marriage bans impose and 
endorse one set of religious precepts regarding marriage, resulting in an unconstitutional establishment of 
religion.”). 
4 See e.g., Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003). 
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I. Current U.S. Marriage System 
In the United States, each state legislature regulates marriage within its jurisdiction and 
sets forth the requirements for procuring a marriage license.5  Under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the Constitution, states will recognize valid marriages from other states,6 unless “the 
marriage is repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of the parties or is contrary to its 
positive laws.”7  Most states require a couple to apply for and receive a marriage license for a 
valid marriage.8  County clerks are the ones who generally issue marriage licenses, but some 
states allow for licenses issued by judges.9  Each state statute sets forth which people are 
authorized to solemnize a marriage.10  In most cases, ordained clergy, judges, justices of the 
peace, and ship captains are all authorized to solemnize marriage.11  While judges, justices of the 
peace and magistrates’ duty is mandatory, clergy authorization is generally permissive.12  Absent 
a statute requiring otherwise, there is no required location for the solemnization of marriage13 
and a civil ceremony or a religious ceremony is equally sufficient.14 
Under the current system of marriage in the U.S., civil and religious marriages are, at 
least theoretically, separate: 
Marriage in the United States is a civil institution.  As such, it belongs to all 
citizens, regardless of their particular moral beliefs or religious creed.  That’s why 
there is no requirement in law that marriage be approved by the church or any 
other religious community.  The consent of the two parties is all it takes to enter a 
                                                 
5 Stevens v. U.S., 146 F.2d 120, 123 (10th Cir. 1944). 
6 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 (providing “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”) 
7 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 6.   
8 55 C.J.S Marriage § 27. 
9 See, e.g. Ala. Code 1975 § 30-1-9 (1998); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-106 (1995). 
10 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 31. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 33. 
14 33 C.J.S. Marriage § 34. 
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marriage.  Beyond licensing requirements, no approval of the state or of any other 
authoritative body is necessary.  Religious officials – whether priests, rabbis, 
ministers, imams, or others – may preside at weddings, but in no sense do 
religious communities define what counts as marriage in the civil arena. . . . 15   
 
Courts distinguish between the two types of marriage.16  The granting of a marriage license does 
not require that any religion recognize or perform a marriage service.17  In fact, our Constitution 
demands that it cannot be required.18  However, this theoretical separation is not as clear as it 
might seem.  As the House Report on the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) states: “It is true, of 
course, that the civil act of marriage is separate from the recognition and blessing of that act by a 
religious institution.  But the fact that there are distinct religious and civil components of 
marriage does not mean that the two do not intersect.”19 
A couple may obtain a marriage license, have a judge or justice of the peace perform the 
ceremony, invoke no religious traditions, and still be legally married.  Such marriages need not 
be recognized by religious authorities.20  Clergy may perform religious commitment ceremonies 
that have no legal authority, although the couple is considered wed in the eyes of the church.21  
According to Yale law professor Stephen L. Carter, “if a marriage takes place in a religious 
context, it is not for the state to have anything to say about it.”22  One might believe that the free 
                                                 
15 WILLIAM STACY JOHNSON, A TIME TO EMBRACE, 196 (2006). 
16 See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954. 
17 Id. 
18 U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof . . . .”); In re Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004) (“the State 
may not interfere . . . with the decision of any religion to refuse to perform religious marriages”). 
19 H. R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 15 (1996). 
20 For example, Catholics may not recognize a valid civil marriage if a person was previously married and did not 
receive an annulment.  See discussion infra Part V. 
21 Protestant denominations including the Unitarian Universalists and the United Church of Christ both perform and 
religiously recognize such union or commitment ceremonies. Unitarian Universalist Association Social Justice 
Statements, http://www.uua.org/actions/immediate/96same-sex.html (last visited March 26, 2007) (resolution for 
Support of the Right to Marry for Same-Sex Couples); United Church of Christ Justice and Peace Marriage 
Resources, http://www.ucc.org/justice/ marriage.htm (last visited March 26, 2007) (referencing adoption of the 
“Equal Marriage Rights for All” Resolution). 
22 Stephen L. Carter, “Defending” Marriage: A Modest Proposal, 41 HOW. L.J. 215, 222 (1998).  This does not, 
however, preclude a particular denomination from passing and enforcing laws about same-sex unions.  Some clergy 
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exercise of religion would demand such a result.  That is not the case.  In many states it is 
unlawful to perform a marriage ceremony without a valid license.23  “A man and woman who 
wish to be married in the eyes of their faith, but not the state, risk making criminals of clergy 
who accommodate their wish.”24  Thus, religious unions are not free from state interference.  The 
state can punish religious officiants for performing services that are valid under their religious 
tenants but have no civil force or effect.25 
As recently as January 2007, a New Hampshire representative sponsored a bill that 
“would permit religious officiants of any stripe to perform marriages according to custom, 
‘provided that such marriages do not conflict with existing state law prohibiting marriage 
between persons of the same sex.’”26  Some clergy believe that “the bill is a response to a 
growing sentiment in the liberal clerical community to stop asking for licenses from couples, gay 
or straight, seeking religious marriages.”27  Ellen Musinsky, a family law specialist and professor 
at the Franklin Pierce Law Center, thinks the only intent behind the bill is interference with 
churches and religious officials’ right to decide what unions to religiously solemnize.28   
Thus, the U.S. marriage system has become a convoluted mess.  Our courts recognize and 
distinguish between civil and religious marriage.  Civil marriage is obtainable separate and apart 
                                                                                                                                                             
face ecclesiastical trials for violating church law if they perform same-sex unions.  See, Gustav Niebuhr, Methodist 
Pastor Faces Trial for Uniting 2 Men, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A20. 
23 Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1794 n.144 (2005). 
24 Id.  Because the prohibition is against marriage ceremonies and not commitment ceremonies, this may be less of a 
problem for denominations that have the ability to create and perform a different ceremony than a “marriage” 
ceremony.  But for religions that only have one service in their faith that unifies a couple, those clergy are prohibited 
from performing services completely consistent with their religion (or at least at risk of criminal sanctions if they 
choose to perform such services).   
25 This appears to be a Free Exercise violation, but no one seems to have challenged it as such.  But see, People v. 
Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 899, 902 (2004) (Under an Equal protection argument, two ministers arrested for 
performing same-sex marriage ceremonies without marriage licenses had charges dismissed on the theory that if it 
was unconstitutional to deny the marriage licenses to the couples, then it was unconstitutional to charge the 
ministers with a crime for performing the ceremonies without one.) 
26 Beverley Wang, Rep. Seeks Change to Marriage Law, (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.boston.com/news/local/new_ha
mpshire/articles/2007/01/22/rep_seeks_change_to_marriage_law/ (last visited February 1, 2007). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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from any religious pretext.  But, religious marriage without civil marriage is generally 
unavailable, given the criminal risk to clergy who would perform them.  For those (opposite sex 
couples) who do choose to have a religious ceremony, they may have their religious officiant 
certify their civil marriage at the same time.  Thus, although the U.S. system is designed to 
separate religious and civil marriage, and indeed recognizes that such a separation exists, in truth 
the two forms of marriage have become conflated.  This conflation runs afoul of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. 
II. Establishment Clause 
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, when there is a claim that the Establishment 
Clause has been violated, there are four tests, or lenses, through which the challenged action or 
statute may be evaluated: the Lemon test, the endorsement test, the coercion test, and the 
tradition test.29  Evaluating the current U.S. marital framework under these four tests, it is clear 
that the lack of separation between civil and religious marriage is unconstitutional, regardless of 
which test is used.   
The Lemon test is so named because it was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.30  Under the 
Lemon test, there must be a secular legislative purpose; the primary effect of the statute or action 
must not result in the advancement or prohibition of religion; and it must not result in excessive 
government entanglement.31  If any one of these three prongs is violated, the statute or action is 
unconstitutional.   
                                                 
29 Rather than evaluate the accuracy or sustainability of each test and decide which is the most appropriate for the 
situation, I have chosen to evaluate the current marriage system under all four commonly utilized Establishment 
Clause tests.  The reason being that it is difficult, especially with the recent changes to the Court, to determine which 
test each justice finds persuasive. 
30 403 U.S. 603 (1971). 
31 Id. at 612-13. 
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Under the Lemon test, both the primary effects and entanglement prongs are violated.32  
Because religious officiants are unable to validate marriage certificates for same-sex couples the 
way they can for heterosexual couples, they are unable to give equal validation to the same-sex 
couple, even though their religion treats them equally.  The inability to give equal treatment to 
marriages that the religion holds equal, resulting from the commingling of religious and civil 
marriage, establishes the position of inequality at the expense of those faiths that believe same-
sex couples should be allowed to marry.  That there is only one service which provides both the 
civil and religious recognition of the marriage exacerbates this problem.  The system creates the 
illusion that the religious service confers the benefits of civil marriage.  To hold a religious 
service that does not result in the creation of a civil marriage creates the illusion that the 
relationship is religiously inadequate because the clergy did not give it civil validation.  The 
theory being that if the marriages were equal under the religious tenets, the outcomes would be 
the same.  Moreover, the fact that clergy may risk criminal penalties in order to perform such a 
religious service makes clergy even less likely to perform such a service, even though their faith 
would allow it.  By advancing the religion of those faiths that believe same-sex marriage is 
                                                 
32 There is an argument that allowing clergy to officiate civil marriages violates the secular purpose prong.  “[T]he 
State acts unconstitutionally if it . . . uses religious means to serve secular ends where secular means would suffice.” 
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twshp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Allowing clergy to 
validate civil marriage certificates uses a religious means, i.e. religious officiants, to achieve a secular purpose, i.e. 
the validation of civil marriage.  Secular means already exist because civil marriages may be officiated by Justices 
of the Peace or judges.  If clergy cannot officiate civil marriage, the Justices of the Peace and judges have an 
increased burden.  Thus, the state benefits from this system of interchangeable officiants for civil marriage.  
Although a plausible theoretical argument, in actuality the benefit is to the marrying couple who does not have to 
have the hassle and cost of two ceremonies in order to achieve both religious and civil recognition of their marriage.  
Also, some have argued that the current system is constitutional because the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses require clergy to be able to perform civil marriages.  Amy Gutmann, Religious Freedom and Civic 
Responsibility, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 907, 914-15 (1999) (arguing that the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses require separation of church and state, not church and politics, and thus “[c]lergy of all churches should be 
able to marry couples in a religion and also in the eyes of the civil law.  So as not to coerce any citizens into a 
religious marriage, governmental officials also should be able to marry couples solely in the eyes of the law.”). 
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wrong, and prohibiting the religion of those faiths that would perform such services, the current 
marriage system violates the primary effects prong of the Lemon test.33 
The commingling of religious and civil marriage also results in excessive entanglement.  
In order for the state to determine whether a clergy member may solemnize civil marriage 
licenses, the state must make a determination as to whether the religion is sufficient under the 
state statute.  In order for the state to examine a religion and decide whether it can confer the 
benefits of marriage the state must impermissibly take a stance on whether the religion is valid.34  
This evaluation results in the state being entangled in a determination of what is a valid religion.  
Additionally, there is the potential for excessive entanglement in states with laws prohibiting 
clergy from performing marriage ceremonies without a civil marriage license.  In those cases, the 
state must make a determination about whether the service the clergy performed was a “marriage 
ceremony.”  For religions with more than one union or commitment service, the government 
would be making a determination about whether a particular service conferred religious marriage 
and, therefore, violated the law.  Making such a determination would require the government to 
make an impermissible foray into the realm of religious beliefs and requirements of a particular 
congregation, denomination, or religion in violation of the excessive entanglement prong. 
Having violated both the excessive entanglement and the primary effects prongs, the 
current marriage system is unconstitutional under the Lemon test.35  However, some justices have 
                                                 
33 Wilson, supra note 3, at 674 (linking the government’s “decidedly sectarian action” of banning same-sex marriage 
to Establishment Clause violations because religions who support same-sex marriage “are finding themselves told 
that their beliefs are less valuable to society because they are more inclusive of same-sex couples”). 
34 See, O’Neill v. Hubbard, 40 N.Y.S.2d 202, 204-05 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (holding unconstitutional a statute limiting 
clergy members qualified to solemnize marriages to the federal census of religious bodies because “the right to have 
a marriage solemnized by a minister of one’s own faith is an incident of that guarantee [of Free Exercise].”). 
35 For a similar discussion and conclusion addressing the ban on same-sex marriage, see Amelia A. Miller, Letting 
Go of a National Religion: Why the State Should Relinquish All Control Over Marriage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2185, 
2212 (2005). 
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questioned the utility of the Lemon test.36  It is important, therefore, to continue to examine the 
constitutionality of the U.S. marriage system under the other Establishment Clause tests since 
there is no agreement that the Lemon test’s outcome would be controlling. 
The endorsement test comes from Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch v. 
Donnelly,37 and is so named from her statement that “[e]ndorsement sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders . . . and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders.”38  Thus, the crux of the examination under this test is whether a governmental action 
makes people feel they are favored or disfavored in the political community based on their 
religion.  If it does, it is unconstitutional. 
In 2004, President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union Address, said that “[o]ur 
nation must defend the sanctity of marriage” in promotion of a constitutional ban against same-
sex marriage.  Those religions which allow same-sex unions and believe same-sex marriage 
should be available are made to feel disfavored in the political community based on their 
religious beliefs of marriage equality.  The problem with such a presidential pronouncement is 
that: 
When the government arrogates to itself a role in religious affairs, it abandons its 
obligation as guarantor of democracy.  Democracy requires the nourishment of 
dialog and dissent, while religious faith puts its trust in an ultimate divine 
authority above all human deliberation.  When the government appropriates 
religious truth, it ‘transforms rational debate into theological decree.’  Those who 
disagree no longer are questioning the policy judgment of the elected but the rules 
of a higher authority who is beyond reproach.39  
 
                                                 
36 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 889-90 (2005) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (compiling cases to 
support the proposition that the Lemon test is “discredited, to begin with, because a majority of the Justices on the 
current Court . . . have, in separate opinions, repudiated the brain-spun ‘Lemon test’”). 
37 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
38 Id. at 688 (O’Conner, J., concurring). 
39 Lee, 505 U.S. at 607 (Blackmun, concurring) (internal cites omitted). 
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When the President and Congressional leaders consistently present their convictions on 
the immorality of homosexuality and, therefore, same-sex marriage, based on their religious 
beliefs, a marriage system that enforces those religious beliefs endorses that religion over those 
that believe in marriage equality. 40  In doing so, the political system marginalizes those who 
hold different religious beliefs.  This is exactly the type of situation the Establishment Clause 
was designed to prevent.  This simultaneous marginalization of those who support same-sex 
marriage and endorsement of those who do not under the current U.S. marriage system is a clear 
violation of the endorsement test.  “When the government takes sides in a serious theological 
dispute, it has effectively endorsed the religion with which it sides.”41  Some opponents of same-
sex marriage argue that homosexuality is immoral without expressing it in religious terms so as 
to claim a secular purpose.  However, marriage “[p]reservationism, stripped of its idiosyncrasies, 
is nothing but bare animus--an illegitimate and irrational basis for public policy.”42  In either 
case, the position is unsustainable.  It is either a firmly held religious belief being 
unconstitutionally endorsed by the government, or a personal moral belief that is unable to 
support policy against even a rational basis. 
The coercion test first appeared in Lee v. Weisman43 in the context of graduation prayer.  
There are two forms of coercion, direct and indirect.  Direct coercion results from any situation 
where the government de facto coerces people into a religious practice.  Indirect coercion results 
                                                 
40 For an in depth discussion of why same-sex marriage bans and the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment violate 
both the Lemon and establishment tests, see Wilson, supra note 3. 
41 Wilson, supra note 3, at 674.  See also, Miller, supra note 35, at 2212 (giving an endorsement test analysis to the 
banning of same-sex marriage). 
42 Id. at 667; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 583 (2003).  See also, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) 
(the “desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” emphasis in 
original). 
43 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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when the government directs a formal religious exercise in such a way as to oblige the 
participation of objectors.44   
The government is arguably coercing people into a religious practice under the current 
marriage system. 45  Whether it is indirect or direct is not completely clear.  But, the fact that 
some couples may feel required to go through a religious ceremony in order to feel that their 
marriage is valid because civil marriage is given second-rate status, suggests coercion.  This may 
be direct because the state machinery of marriage coerces people into a religious practice – the 
religious ceremony.  It is potentially indirect because the state has mixed religious and civil 
marriage by allowing a single service to confer both legal and religious status simultaneously, in 
such a way that even people with no religious affiliation request to have their marriage in a 
church performed by clergy.  Whether it is direct or indirect, there is arguably enough 
governmental coercion to violate this test. 
The tradition test comes from Marsh v. Chambers.46  Although there is no specific rule to 
follow, generally whether something is unconstitutional depends on whether it is “deeply 
embedded in the history and tradition of his country.”47  Most people’s initial response is that 
marriage is a longstanding American tradition.  The problem becomes how far back into the 
history of marriage does one look.  Religious communities and the state have almost never 
agreed about marriage.  Marriage has not always been seen as “ordained by God” in the 
Christian community.  Ancient Christianity rejected sex and marriage as “[p]romoting the 
corrupt secular world” because it was part of Roman culture.48  Moving forward in time, when 
                                                 
44 Id. at 592-94. 
45 For the view that the coercion test “is not suited to the issues involved in an analysis of marriage,” see Miller, 
supra note 35, at 2213. 
46 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
47 Id. at 786 (In this particular case, applying the test in the context of legislative prayer). 
48 E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 59 (1999). 
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the Protestants split from the Catholics, they considered marriage a secular ceremony as opposed 
to the Catholics’ view of marriage as a sacrament.49  This was in part because the creation of 
private marriage had created such a legal mess.50  The Protestants left regulation of marriage to 
the rising nation-states.51  The abrogation of control came because the Protestants did not have 
the power to control the public recognition of marriage and did not want to take the time to build 
it.52  Significantly, even the Catholic Church did not recognize marriage as a sacrament until 
1215.53   
Assuming that such history is too far removed from a consideration of whether something 
is an American tradition, both England and the early colonies treated marriage as civil in nature.  
By 1753, England had transformed marriage “from a private sacrament to a publicly authorized 
contract.”54  In the colonies, each region had its own definition of marriage.55  Judges and 
legislatures used the “common-law marriage” invention to create a system where it was neither 
vows nor civil registration that created marriage, but the actions of the couples themselves.56  By 
the 1870s, the marriage reform movement required formal ceremonies and registration, and by 
the end of the nineteenth century, marriage was a public, state-regulated status.57   
It would be fair to argue that America has always recognized marriage and, therefore, 
marriage is a tradition.  But to say marriage is a longstanding American tradition is one thing; to 
say that the current commingling of religious and civil marriage is a longstanding American 
tradition is something else entirely.  Even looking just at American colonial history, the 
                                                 
49 Id. at 66, 201. 
50 Id. at 199-200. 
51 Id. at 201. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 196. 
54 Id. at 203. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 204. 
57 Id. at 205. 
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common-law system allowed the couple themselves to create a marriage that was later 
recognized by the law.58  The idea that the American civil system has always recognized the 
religious definition of marriage is unsupported by the history.  Marriage, in its current hybrid 
civil/religious form, is not a longstanding American tradition.  As such, the current system fails 
the tradition test. 
The Court has examined some Establishment Clause cases under a theory of neutrality 
and private choice.59  Although the neutrality argument to this point have been contained to 
school-funding cases, it could be applied in this case and thus should be examined.  In Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court held that a school voucher program did not violate the 
Establishment Clause even though “96% of scholarship recipients enrolled in religious schools,” 
because the receipt of that governmental money by religious institutions was the result of 
“genuine and independent private choice.”60  Using this argument, under the current marriage 
system it should not matter if 96% of all civil marriages are performed by clergy because the law 
merely allows people the independent choice of having clergy or public officials perform the 
service.  It is through a genuine and independent private choice by the couple that their civil 
marriage is officiated by religious clergy.61  This could be a strong argument, but neutrality is not 
as easily applicable to the marriage context as it was in the school-funding context because of 
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den.62   
                                                 
58 Id. at 204. 
59 See, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002);  
60 Id. at 652, 658. 
61 This is not necessarily a genuine and independent private choice, however.  The only two choices are public 
official or religious clergy.  Unlike in the school context where the choice is between public school and private 
school of any flavor, whether religious or not, the only non-state officials allowed to solemnize marriage are clergy.  
Thus, the “choice” in this case is between government and religion, not between private religion and private non-
religion.  If a statute authorizes ship captains, there is another non-public official choice, but because they are not 
authorized in all cases where as clergy generally are, this does not really refute the argument. 
62 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
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In Larkin, the Massachusetts legislature gave churches veto power regarding liquor 
license applications where the applicant was located within 500 feet of the church.63  In ruling 
the statute was unconstitutional, the Court held that “the challenged statute [] enmeshes churches 
in the processes of government and creates the danger of ‘[p]olitical fragmentation and 
divisiveness along religious lines.’”64  Just as the Massachusetts law “delegated to or shared with 
religious institutions” the zoning power,65 current marriage statutes have either delegated to or 
share with clergy the ability to confer civil marriage.  “[D]elegating a governmental power to 
religious institutions inescapably implicates the Establishment Clause.”66  Moreover, the Court in 
Larkin noted that “the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and 
State provides a significant symbol benefit to religion on the minds of some by reason of the 
power conferred.”67  Thus, a neutrality and private choice argument is inapplicable in the 
marriage context because the state has impermissibly granted religion, through clergy, the ability 
to “exercise [] substantial governmental powers contrary to [the Court’s] consistent interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause.”68   
Having determined that the current marriage system violates the Establishment Clause 
under all four tests, the next step is to look at potential solutions.  Looking back at the history of 
marriage, at various times it has been conferred by the church, the state, or the couple 
themselves, and regulated by the church, the state, or both.  The only consistency in this history 
is that the power to confer marriage has consistently changed hands.  This convoluted history 
makes it easy to understand why the current marriage system is such a mess.  It has never been 
                                                 
63 Id. at 117-20. 
64 Id. at 127. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 123. 
67 Id. at 125-26. 
68 Id. at 126. 
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clear whether marriage is religious in nature, civil in nature, or some combination of the two.  
One solution, then, is creating clearer boundaries between civil and religious marriage.69   
III. Separating Civil and Religious Marriage 
When considering creating such boundaries, it is helpful to examine how other countries 
with similar religious diversity have set up their marriage systems and what boundaries they 
utilize.  Although no country can provide a perfect example, Germany provides a particularly 
useful model.  As one of the starting places of the Protestant Reformation, it has dealt with 
similar religious/civil marital history to the United States.  It currently has a diverse religious 
population, including Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and Christians.70  And, although Germany is 
perhaps not as religiously diverse as the United States, under Article 4 of the German 
Constitution, the government provides for freedom of faith, conscience, and creed71 – a necessity 
if a model is to have utility in a country founded on religious independence.  
In Germany, it is the law that specifically keeps civil and religious marriage separate.  
Civil marriage is governed by the German Civil Code.72  Section 1588 states that “[t]he 
obligations to the church with regard to marriage are not affected by the provisions of this 
chapter.”73  Religious clergy may not officiate a civil wedding; it may only be performed a civil 
registrar.74  Furthermore, a couple must have a civil ceremony at the Registry Office before a 
                                                 
69 See, Wilson, supra note 3, at 659 (arguing that a bright-line separation of religious marriage and civil marriage 
“would add certainty and stability to the law”). 
70 See, Inke Muehlhoff, Freedom of Religion in Public Schools in Germany and in the United States, 28 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 405, 489 (2000) (noting that “religious diversity in Germany has greatly increased over the past twenty 
years”); see also, World Religion Day Statistics of Religion, http://www.worldreligionday.org/statistics.html (last 
visited March 24, 2007) (listing the religious breakdown in Germany as “Protestant 38%, Roman Catholic 34%, 
Muslim 1.7%, Unaffiliated or other 26.3%”). 
71 Art. 4 Grundgesetz (Basic Law, the German Constitution) BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
14 (2001) available at http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/parliament/function/legal/germanbasiclaw.pdf. 
72 German Civil Code §§ 1297-1588; THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE (AS AMENDED JANUARY 1, 1992) 280 (Simon L. 
Goren trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1994). 
73 German Civil Code § 1588. 
74 Case, supra note 23, at 1793-1794. 
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religious wedding can be performed.75  “Civil wedding ceremonies are only possible inside the 
Registry office, and religious weddings can normally only be celebrated inside churches.”76  
Although couples may have clergy perform a separate religious ceremony, it has “no legal effect 
under German law.” 77  Under the German system, for a couple to receive both civil and religious 
recognition of marriage, they must have two ceremonies at different times and places. 
The next issue, then, is what such a system would look like, and how would it differ from 
what already exists.  Currently, couples apply for a marriage license which must then be signed 
and witnessed and returned to the state before the civil marriage is valid.  This is often done by 
the religious officiant performing the service, but is also done by judges and justices of the peace 
for those not having a religious service.78  Some clergy have expressed a preference for two 
different marriage services performed in two different places to separate civil and religious 
marriage, as occurs in Germany, and other parts of Europe and South America.79  Given the 
potential animosity toward this change because of the additional time, expense, and hassle it 
would require to have two separate ceremonies compared to the current one-stop system, there is 
another more practical solution that still effectively separates civil and religious marriage. 
                                                 
75 WeddingDetails.com, German Lore & Tradition: A Civil Ceremony, http://www.weddingdetails.com/lore/german
.cfm (last visited February 1, 2007).  Because Muslims, Jews, and atheists also marry at the Registry, it avoids things 
like organ music or stained-glass windows that some might find “too Christian.”  HowToGermany.com, Getting 
Married, http://www.howtogermany.com/pages/marriage.html (last visited February 1, 2007). 
76 WeddingDetails.com, supra note 75; Suite 101, Getting Married…German Style, 
http://www.suite101.com/article.cfm/german_interest/114872 (“If a religious wedding is desired, it will take place 
either later in the afternoon, or a few days later.  At that time the couple will enter the church together and walk 
down the isle together since, under the law, they are already married.”); World Wedding Traditions, German 
Wedding Traditions, http://www.worldweddingtraditions.com/locations/west_europe_traditions/german_traditions.h
tml (noting that the first service is a civil ceremony at the civic center and later a religious service); Topics Online 
Magazine, Marriage in Germany, http://www.topics-mag.com/internatl/weddings/german-wedding.htm (“the civil 
wedding may take place in the city hall”). 
77 Case, supra note 23, at 1794, quoting FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 297 (Carolyn Hammond & Alison Perry eds., 2d 
ed. 2002). 
78 See discussion infra, Part I. 
79 Fr. Paul Sretenovic, Problems and Solutions Regarding Natural Marriage and Civil Marriage. 
http://www.traditioninaction.org/religious/k002rpMarriage.html. 
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The solution is having the marriage license from the county be effective upon receipt by 
the couple; essentially making the license the marriage certificate.  There are very few licenses 
that one receives from the state that require additional validation before usage.  When one 
receives a driver’s license or fishing or hunting license, it is valid upon receipt.  One makes 
application and supplies the required information to the appropriate state agency and ultimately 
receives a valid license.  Couples would make application for the marriage license and supply the 
agency with information regarding eligibility to marry and include required items such as 
documents regarding previous marriages, blood test results, etc.  By the time the couple receives 
the license, the state has already given its approval for the civil marriage.  Rather than require the 
marriage license then be validated through ceremony, the license would be the certification of 
marriage.  It would certify that the state finds that the couple meets the requirements and, 
therefore, is civilly married.  Under such a system, couples who intend both religious and civil 
marriage receive each independently, without having to have two ceremonies.  Couples who do 
not seek civil marriage may have any type of commitment service they desire – religious or 
otherwise.  This ceremony is then no different for them than it is for those couples who have 
chosen to be civilly married because in neither case does the religious ceremony pronounce the 
couple civilly married.  All services, regardless of whether they are religious, would now confer 
only religious marriage or public commitment.  They are all equally removed from the state.  For 
couples who wish to have only one “anniversary,” the state could certify that the couple is 
certified as married as of “x” date and allow the couple to have the civil marriage certified as of 
the date of their religious or commitment service. 
Under this system, the change to the state mechanism is minimal.  Indeed, the burden on 
the states is lessened.  Rather than hand out the license and then record the marriage certificate if 
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and when it is returned, the state need only issue the certificate and record the marriage based on 
the initial application.  This change results in one step rather than two, and removes problems of 
something getting “lost in the mail,” or the officiant forgetting to send it.  Furthermore, the 
couple may still have the religious or nonreligious commitment or marriage ceremony of choice.  
The state has no control over what, if any, service the couple chooses to have.  And, a religious 
officiant no longer certifies or witnesses the civil marriage, but merely presides over that which 
is within his or her domain - a religious service.   
There are additional benefits to such a system beyond simplicity and separation.  In an 
age where there is a great deal of concern about people jumping into marriage too quickly, this 
separated system also requires couples be more cognizant of the commitment they are making 
because there is no second step.  Successful application would create the civil marriage, not just 
the potential for one.  Furthermore, because the application would result in creating the marriage, 
the state is likely to require some type of waiting period while it reviews the paperwork to make 
certain the couple is eligible for civil marriage.  That waiting period could cut down on the rash, 
drunken marriages typified in the media by Britney Spears’ 24-hour Las Vegas wedding.80   
For couples who need the “thinking period” created under the current system by the 
second step of having a service officiated, this system can be modified to have a similar period.  
After the state complete its certification process during the waiting period, the couple must return 
and both members sign the certification of marriage.  If the couple does not come back in to sign 
for and pick-up their certification, then they are not civilly married.  There could be a 30-day 
window for couples to pick-up their certification, after which time the file would be closed and 
the couple would not be civilly married.  After that time, they would have to reapply if they still 
                                                 
80 See, Pete Alfano, Wedding Bells Still A'peal, Despite Stats, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 30, 2004, at F1 
(“Pro-marriage groups cringe at the example being set by Britney Spears, who married a childhood friend in Las 
Vegas and then untied the knot barely 24 hours later.”) 
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wanted to be married.  This change does not really add any extra work for the state.  The state 
would already need a way to mark its files regarding their dispositions.  By requiring the couple 
to come in and sign for the certification to make the transaction complete, the state receives 
signature proof that a couple was notified of their civil marriage. 
This “simple” separation of religious and civil marriage is not without complications.  
One of the larger complications is the difficulty that arises when one attempts to distinguish 
between the two types of marriage while allowing them both to retain the same title.  Indeed, 
many of the issues surrounding the commingling of religious and civil marriage come from the 
fact that both use the same term.81  This is a direct result of the convoluted history of the power 
of marriage being passed back and forth between religion and the state.82  According to David 
Kirp, a professor of public policy at UC Berkeley, “we’d do well to unpack the double meaning 
of marriage as a word that carries both secular and sacred connotation.  The logical way to 
accomplish this would be to call state-sanctioned marriage, whatever the gender of the partners, 
what it really is: a civil union.”83  This is not a new idea.  In 2005, one scholar noted that “the 
proper solution would simply be to convert all ‘civil’ marriages (which . . . are really religious 
marriages with civil contractual benefits) into civil unions.  Such an act would leave the legal 
contractual agreements in place, unchanged.  All that would change would be the name 
(‘marriage’ to ‘union’).”84   
The problem with this proposal is that labels matter.  If labels were unimportant, there 
would be no argument over whether to call the rights of marriage given to same-sex couples 
                                                 
81 Wilson, supra note 3, at 562 (“America is suffering from a definitional crisis regarding the term ‘marriage’”). 
82 See discussion infra, Part II. 
83 David L. Kirp, A Marriage, Gay or Strait, is First a Civil Union, Mar. 2, 2004, 
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/03/02_kirp.shtml. 
84 Miller, supra note 35, at 2215. 
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“unions” or “marriages.”85  Married couples are unlikely to want the state recognizing their 
relationship as a civil union.86  Churches are equally unlikely to give up the marriage label.  
Indeed, it is often declared that marriage is ordained by God.  It also seems less romantic to send 
invitations for a religious union. 87  The word marriage is deeply ingrained in American culture.88  
Its use conjures up mental images of couples surrounded by friends and family, often dressed in 
formal wear, joining their lives together.89   
There are additional benefits to the label of marriage, not the least of which is the right to 
use the term “spouse.”  The ability to use the marital term “spouse” conveys all types of legal 
rights and economic benefits that “partner” does not carry. 90  There are business partners, same-
sex couple partners, and legal civil-union partners.  Walking into a hospital and telling the staff 
that you are trying to see your partner does not carry the same weight as trying to see your 
spouse.  Without the term marriage, one cannot use the term spouse91 - a term that provides both 
greater clarity and security.  Although Kirp is correct that what the state conveys is a civil union, 
and it would be simpler to have separate terms, given the attachment to the term marriage, the 
more likely solution is to differentiate using the labels “civil” and “religious” before “marriage” 
to distinguish which type is being referenced.   
                                                 
85 See generally, EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO 
MARRY 123-44 (2004) (discussing why use of another term other than marriage is both inadequate and 
unnecessary); see also, Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004) (holding that use 
of the term “civil union” rather than “civil marriage” denoted second-class status). 
86 WOLFSON, supra note 85, at 134 (discussing the differences in the words civil union and marriage, noting that 
“civil union doesn’t even have a verb”). 
87 See, Marriage It Is Not; Same-Sex Couples Are Not Flocking To Civil Unions, THE REC., MAR. 22, 2007, at L08 
(Noting that heterosexual couples are not going to want to say “I love you.  Let’s get unionized.”). 
88 See, e.g., Leonard Greene, Shades of Gay in N.J. Nups Ruling, N.Y. POST, Oct. 26, 2006, at 2 (“When you say the 
word ‘marriage’ in our society, it has a meaning you can’t replace with another word or set of words.”); Katharine 
B. Silbaugh, The Practice of Marriage, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 189, 190 (2005) (“[M]arriage enjoys a social meaning 
distinct from simple cohabitation”). 
89 WOLFSON, supra note 85, at 105. 
90 WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 437 (Jesse Dukeminier et al. eds., 7th ed. 2005). 
91 For example, DOMA defines spouse for federal purposes to exclude those in civil unions because the “word 
spouse refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” Defense of Marriage Act § 3 
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). 
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Having determined that it is feasible to separate religious and civil marriage because 
other countries have successfully done so, offered a simple mechanism that simplifies the work 
of the state and reduces the hassle of a two-ceremony system, and recognized that, at least in the 
short term, the issue of labels for the different marriages is unlikely to be resolved, there is a 
larger issue yet to consider.  Substituting one unconstitutional marriage system for another is 
unwise and wasteful of time and resources.  Before switching to a separation model, that model 
must be determined to be constitutional. 
IV. Constitutionality 
Allowing religious marriage to be commingled with civil marriage has created tension 
between people’s religious beliefs and the laws of the state.  Creating clearer boundaries between 
religious and civil marriage not only relieves that tension, but is more consistent with the 
jurisprudential history of the Establishment Clause.  “[T]he clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’”92  The 
intention was “not only to keep the states’ hands out of religion, but to keep religion’s hands off 
the state . . . .”93  In Engel v. Vitale,94 the Court stated that “[the Establishment Clause’s] first and 
immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy 
government and to degrade religion.”95  Such separation is vitally important because “religion is 
too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”96  
Thus, separating religious marriage from civil marriage is as much to protect the religious beliefs 
of those whose disagree with the state as it is to protect the rights of equality and religious 
freedom from religious beliefs.   
                                                 
92 Everson v. Bd. of Ed. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
93 Everson, 330 U.S. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
94 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
95 Id. at 431. 
96 Id. at 432. 
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The Court’s reliance on a theory of separation in Establishment Clause jurisprudence had 
been eroded or at least changed.  In light of the Court’s more recent decisions, some scholars 
believe that “the traditional theory of separation is giving way to a theory of equality (or more 
accurately, protection for religious choice).”97  But, they think that whatever replaces 
separationism will still involve principles of equality or neutrality.98  Others argue that 
separationism and neutrality are not inconsistent or incompatible, and thus the Court need not get 
rid of separation to use neutrality.99  Still others argue “that neutrality, whether formal or 
substantive, does not exist.”100  With the principal of separation in question and scholars 
presenting so many different academic positions on the utility and longevity of neutrality with or 
without separation, it is difficult to know what arguments will influence the Court.  Therefore, it 
is appropriate to evaluate the separation system under the same tests that were used to establish 
the current system’s unconstitutionality.   
Where the current system fails the four Establishment Clause tests, the separation of 
religious and civil marriage satisfies them all.  Under the Lemon test, the separation satisfies the 
first prong because it removes any religious purpose from civil marriage.101  With no religious 
purpose, there remains only a secular purpose to the marriage.  Separation also creates neither an 
enhancement nor a prohibition of religion.  Religions are free to perform religious marriages 
wholly consistent with their doctrine and need not consider any governmental considerations 
such as whether enough time has passed since the license has been issued for the ceremony to be 
                                                 
97 John H. Garvey, What’s Next After Separationism?, 46 EMORY L.J. 75, 75 (1997). 
98 Id. 
99 Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997) (arguing that 
separation and neutrality are not inconsistent positions.) 
100 Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the 
Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489 (2004). 
101 The separation of religious and civil marriage also addresses the theoretical argument, discussed infra note 32, 
about secular purposes achieved through religious means because under this proposal, there would be separate civil 
and religious officiants for the different types of marriage. 
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performed.  Making them totally separate also means there can be no entanglement.  Thus, all 
three prongs of the Lemon test are satisfied by separating religious and civil marriage. 
Similarly, separation satisfies the endorsement test.  There can be no religious preference 
if civil marriages are wholly distinguished from religious marriage.  No religion is preferred, 
because each can perform services consistent with its doctrine.  It is possible to argue that those 
whose religious beliefs disagree with same-sex marriage would be made to feel like political 
outsiders if the state chooses to allow same-sex civil marriage.  The governmental system does 
not, in fact, make them political outsiders.  Under the separation doctrine, their beliefs are not 
challenged.  They are entitled to deny religious marriage to anyone their beliefs command.  
Indeed, all religions are treated equally because each can establish and enforce religious marriage 
according to its own religious tenets.  Furthermore, the government cannot endorse any 
particular religion when civil marriage is wholly secular.   
In like manner, the separation satisfies the coercion test.  As noted above, religious 
communities are not coerced to perform marriages they disagree with.  A community may 
continue to deny a same-sex couple a religious marriage ceremony if it is against the 
community’s beliefs.  The converse is also true.  The non-religious are not coerced into have a 
religious ceremony just to feel that their marriages are considered valid.  Rather, their civil 
marriage is equal to any other civil marriage, without regard to whether they have also obtained a 
religious marriage.  Should they so choose, a separate religious ceremony is always available.  
But, having separated the religious marriage service from the civil marriage service, couples may 
no longer feel a need to find a religious building and/or clergy member to perform the civil 
service.  They are no longer coerced. 
- 23 - 
Finally, there is a question of tradition.  To evaluate a separated marriage system under 
the tradition test would be illogical.  The whole point is that it is a new system; something new 
by definition cannot be a tradition.  Some have argued that tradition “cannot overpower rights so 
fundamental to an individual as marriage” and thus the test is inapplicable in such a context.102  
Alternatively, and perhaps more persuasive, is the argument that changing marriage to remove 
outdated and unsubstantiated moral arguments, when they infringe on fundamental rights, is a 
tradition.  The most analogous example is Loving v. Virginia.103  In ruling that the Lovings’ 
interracial marriage was criminal, the trial judge wrote an opinion that included:  
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, maley, and red, and he 
placed them on separate continents.  And but for the interference with his 
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.  The fact that he 
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. . . .104 
 
Resting the decision on such a religious basis was seen as appropriate.  The U.S. had a long 
tradition of anti-miscegenation that was propagated by the belief that God made white people 
better than the others.  No matter what moral and religious arguments were set forth by the 
opponents, the understanding of the equality of races that society was beginning to embrace, with 
strong help from the Fourteenth Amendment, required the elimination of anti-miscegenation 
laws.105  Today, the decision in Loving seems ridiculously obvious.  But 40 years ago when it 
was made, it was extremely controversial.  In a similar manner, 40 years from now, marriage 
may be available to all, regardless of their sexual orientation, and that result will seem obvious.  
Marriage, as a legal concept, has changed as society has changed.  The U.S. has a tradition, 
deeply embedded, of changing marriage when it is discovered that the current system infringes 
on fundamental rights.  In Loving, it was the fundamental right of marriage.  Here, it is the 
                                                 
102 Miller, supra note 35, at 2213-14. 
103 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) 
104 Id. at 3. 
105 Id. at 11-12. 
- 24 - 
freedom from the establishment of religion.  As such, the separation of civil marriage from 
religious marriage satisfies the tradition test.   
Separating religious and civil marriage passes the neutrality test because it would treat all 
religions equally.  The laws would be truly neutral toward religion because all religious aspects 
would be removed from civil marriage.  Moreover, the separation of religious and civil marriage 
removes the Larkin problem of having given governmental functions over to religion.  
Separation is a simple solution that satisfies the requirements of all current tests under 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and fixes the violations inherent in the current marriage 
system. 
V. Potential Implications for Same-Sex Marriages 
During the drafting and debate of the Constitution, Jefferson was in favor of the 
Establishment Clause because he “worried that individuals would defer to their church’s clergy 
and creed in a way that would render them subservient to a hierarchy and would deprive them of 
intellectual independence.”106  This is precisely what has occurred in the debates over marriage.  
Rather than being led by the dictates of equality and tolerance found in the Constitution, people 
have pointed to their religious ideals as the reason why marriages laws should not be changed – 
whether the arguments related to divorce, interracial marriage, or same-sex marriage. 107  By 
separating civil marriage from religious marriage, moral arguments based upon religious beliefs 
continue to apply with full force on religious marriage, but no longer carry such great weight in 
the argument over who is entitled to civil marriage.108 
                                                 
106 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 485 (2002). 
107 See, GRAFF, supra note 48, at 238-39. 
108 See generally, Wilson, supra note 3, at 564-65 (noting that “[t]he overwhelming majority of support for bans on 
same-sex civil marriage has come from religious believers, and the so-called ‘secular justifications’ for these bans 
are mere pretexts for religious beliefs that homosexuality, homosexuals, and same-sex couples are evil or sinful”); 
see also, Miller, supra note 35, at 2215-16 (noting that having civil unions and religious marriages protects the 
positions of both sides because “A civil union would confer all the benefits and protections that marriage has 
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Some might argue that having different civil and religious marital statuses would be 
confusing or unworkable.  But, the U.S. already recognizes differences between civil and 
religious marriages, which provide support for the idea that a clearer separation between the two 
types of marriage is a tenable position.   
Religions have long been able to refuse both to recognize civil marriages and divorces 
and to perform religious marriages.  The Catholic Church maintains a position that civil divorce 
is not recognized as the dissolution of religious marriage.  Thus, although civil law allows for 
divorce in all 50 states, Catholic churches are not required to recognize them.  People who have 
not received an annulment or been widowed are not allowed to remarry in the church.  But, the 
church’s prohibition on religious remarriage does not prevent them from being able to obtain a 
civil marriage – or even a religious marriage outside the Catholic Church. 109  In similar fashion, 
couples can be civilly married but not have their marriage recognized under Orthodox 
Judaism.110  And under Islamic law, religious divorce is distinct from civil divorce because the 
religion has specific divorce procedures adherents must follow,111 and Muslim women cannot 
marry non-Muslim men.112  But again, the religion cannot prevent the couple from being civilly 
married or divorced.  It is the delicate balance of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses 
                                                                                                                                                             
traditionally provided, but would not be limited to heterosexual couples.  Of course, churches, synagogues, mosques, 
and other religious institutions could restrict marriage to heterosexual couples if they wish.  Marriage, as a religious 
sacrament, would thus be preserved in whatever form a particular sect deems holy.”). 
109 See, e.g., Hames v. Hames, 316 A.2d 379, 386 (Conn. 1972); see also, Josh Friedes, Can Same-Sex Marriages 
Coexist with Religion, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 533, 537 (2004); Amelia Craig Cramer, The Freedom to Marry Must 
Not be Denied, ARIZONA ATTORNEY, Mar. 2004, at 14, n.1. 
110 Friedes, supra note 109 at 537; Cramer, supra note 109 at 14, n.1.  A popular culture reference for this position is 
the marriage of Tevye’s youngest daughter Chava to someone outside of the faith in the musical Fiddler on the 
Roof.  
111 Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of Jurisdictional Authority, 35 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 413 (2000). 
112 Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe? An Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and 
Their Interaction With Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 460 (2006) citing Sebastian Poulter, The Claim to 
a Separate Islamic System of Personal Law for British Muslims, in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 147, 160 (Chibli Mallat & 
Jane Connors eds., 1990). 
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that allows religion to ignore civil marriage and divorce, but prevents the state from being bound 
by religious dictates.   
If same-sex couples are given the right to civil marriage, it will not affect religious 
communities’ ability to deny them a religious service.  In Massachusetts where same-sex 
marriage already exists, the court made clear that the civil marriage right has no affect on 
religious marriage.113  That is because the Free Exercise provision of the First Amendment 
protects them.114  Because the Constitution allows for and the U.S. system already recognizes 
differences between civil and religious marriage and divorce, there is simply no evidence that 
allowing same-sex couples access to civil marriage would require religions to perform or even 
recognize such civil marriages.115 
By removing religion from civil marriage, the separation helps clean up the same-sex 
marriage debate.  “[B]egin by considering the nature of civil marriage itself.  Simply put, the 
government creates civil marriage.”116  Because the government creates civil marriage, civil 
marriage laws must conform to the federal and state constitutions.  It becomes simpler to 
examine equal protection arguments when the foundations of people’s faiths are not wrapped up 
in the outcome.  People find it difficult to listen to logical and legal arguments if they feel their 
core beliefs are being ignored or denied.  “What may seem obvious and reasonable to those 
advocating gay rights often triggers a deep emotional and religious response in those 
opposed.”117  By separating religious and civil marriage, religious arguments are acknowledged, 
                                                 
113 Opinion of the Justices, 802 N.E.2d at 570 (“the State may not interfere . . . with the decision of any religion to 
refuse to perform religious marriages”). 
114 U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof . . . .”) 
115 The separation of civil and religious marriage also does not prevent clergy being held accountable to their own 
denominations if they perform a same-sex marriage against religious policy; but that is an internal matter for each 
denomination.  See, Niebuhr, supra note 22, at A20. 
116 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954.   
117 JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 199. 
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but can be recognized as applicable to religious marriage as opposed to civil marriage which is 
governed by the laws of the state.  As eloquently stated by Rabbi Michael Namath, 
[T]his national debate has nothing to do with religious wedding ceremonies.  
Regardless of what our politicians decide, some religions will continue to sanctify 
same-sex marriages, and some never will.  Civil marriage must be differentiated 
from religious marriage - because religious marriage is an institution and a 
religious concept that must remain the domain of religion, but civil marriage is a 
set of legal protections and benefits that the government grants based on the 
possession of a civil marriage license.  We do not believe that all religions should 
have to recognize same-sex religious marriage, but we do believe that the 
government must give equal protection to all its citizens and equal respect to all 
its religions.118 
 
Once viewed as a purely secular institution, there is nothing within the structure and 
content of civil marriage that inherently prohibits access to same-sex couples.119  A change in the 
definition of civil marriage by removing the religious elements does not and cannot stop those 
who define religious marriage differently.120  What it will do is prevent the exclusion of same-
sex couples “from constitutional protection under the guise of ‘traditional’ values that are not 
necessarily held by all.”121  Indeed, the general public seems less opposed to granting same-sex 
couples the rights of marriage through civil unions.  It is the marriage terminology that causes 
problems.122  Once the Vermont legislature adopted civil unions, “the political furor died down, 
showing that it is simply not as easy for interest groups to whip up popular opposition to civil 
unions as it is to gay marriage.”123  If people are already willing to grant the benefits of civil 
                                                 
118 Rabbi Michael Namath, Statement Opposing Federal Marriage Amendment before The Coalition Against 
Discrimination in the Constitution (May 9, 2006), http:// rac.org/Articles/index.cfm?id=1594&pge_prg_id=7864. 
119 JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 196. 
120 Id. at 187. 
121 Id. 
122 For instance, in 2006 when the New Jersey Supreme Court “ordered the Legislature to create a law providing the 
same rights and benefits to same-sex couples . . . [t]he Legislature responded by expanding the state’s existing 
domestic partnership rights, [but] stopped short of calling the unions marriage.”  John Holl, Civil Union Door Opens 
to Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2007, at 14NJ2.  And in Massachusetts, after the Massachusetts 
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marriage to same-sex couples without the label, clearly delineating religious marriage from civil 
marriage may allow for forward movement in this area. 
The same-sex marriage debates also bring up discussions of “family values.”  Those 
opposed generally state that being for family values means being against same-sex marriage, but 
there is little in the way of substantive argument as to why one cannot stand for both.124  
Advocates of same-sex marriage believe that expanding civil marriage to include same-sex 
couples reinforces society’s concept of marriage as the norm.125  Denying same-sex couples the 
right to marry makes their families less secure by denying them financial and medical benefits, 
testamentary rights, and legal custody of children they are raising.126  Given the stabilizing 
effects of marriage that “family values” proponents have claimed it to have, the circular 
argument of denying same-sex couples those stabilizing forces because they have been unable to 
“match the outcomes of opposite-sex married couples” who receive the stabilizing forces is 
“irrational” and “impenetrable.”127 
By removing religious beliefs from the debate, the question of family values may be able 
to focus on those values that are important for the state.  Whether those focused on the morality 
and religious issues involved in same-sex relationships ever agree with the idea that same-sex 
marriage promotes family values, pragmatically, it solidifies and secures family units in ways 
beneficial to the states.  A simple example: A same-sex couple that cannot marry has a child.  
One partner is the biological parent or the legal adoptive parent.  The other partner is not allowed 
to adopt the child to become a legal parent.  Should something happen to the legal parent, the 
                                                 
124 See, Anna Dubrovsky, Same-Sex Marriage: A Struggle for Equal Rights, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 
1996, at A1 (describing debates about the Defense of Marriage Act sponsored by Pennsylvania State Representative 
C. Allan Egolf, declaring that same-sex marriages are “repugnant to traditional family values”). 
125 JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 214. 
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child and surviving partner may be left without income and end up on state welfare.  The 
surviving partner may not even be recognized as the child’s parent and the child could lose both 
parents in one traumatic event.  Recognition of the unit as a family would have provided the 
surviving partner and child with security by being recognized as a family.  The child could not be 
removed because the surviving partner would be a legal parent, and inheritance rules and the 
availability of social security benefits would allow them to sustain themselves without state 
welfare.  It is difficult to imagine a context in which allowing same-sex couples to marry is not 
in the state’s best interests.  There may be areas where this is not in the state’s interest, but those 
issues will not even begin to appear while the debate is cluttered with objections based on 
religious morality.  Removing religion from the debate can allow these issues and questions to 
reach the forefront and actually be debated.   
The issue of same-sex marriage also raises questions about the free exercise of religion.  
As discussed above, allowing civil marriage will not interfere with a religion’s right to deny 
religious marriage or refuse to recognize a civil marriage.  Because some states allow for civil 
unions and civil marriage, other Free Exercise issues have arisen.  In Vermont, the town clerks 
filed suit alleging that being required to issue civil union licenses created a substantial burden on 
their religious beliefs under the Vermont Constitution.128  The Vermont Supreme Court held that 
there was no free exercise violation because the law allowed for the assistant town clerk to 
perform the duty and, thus, created no substantial burden.129  In New Jersey, the Attorney 
General ruled that public officials may refuse to perform civil unions so long as they also refuse 
to perform marriages.130  To date, it is estimated that of New Jersey’s 566 mayors, 30 of have 
                                                 
128 Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428 (Vt. 2001). 
129 Id. at 434-35. 
130 Op. N.J. Att’y Gen. 1-2007, Jan. 10, 2007, available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases07/pr20070111a-
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decided to refuse to perform both civil unions and civil marriages.131  Consistent with the Free 
Exercise clause, religious officials may refuse to solemnize civil unions while still performing 
marriages.132 
If civil marriage is separated from religious marriage, there is still a potential argument 
that granting civil marriage to same-sex couples infringes on the free exercise rights of those 
who feel it is immoral or wrong.  Under Employment Division v. Smith,133 the Court noted that 
“free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral 
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his 
religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”134 Thus, so long as there is a neutral law of general 
applicability, it is not required (although it is permissible) to make a free exercise exception.135  
A civil marriage law allowing people to marry regardless of their spouse’s gender would be 
neutral and generally applicable, thus no free exercise exception would be required under Smith.  
Of course, just as New Jersey gave its mayors the option of performing both marriages and civil 
unions, or performing neither, governments are allowed to make free exercise exceptions if they 
so choose; they just are not required to.136 
Given that the separation model has such potential for advancing same-sex marriage 
debates and ultimately receiving such rights, it is important to recognize that a separation model 
does not always result in same-sex marriage being granted.  A strict use of the previously 
discussed German model for example is problematic.  The largest set back of this model is that 
Germany uses civil unions and does not allow gay marriage.  The German Constitution requires 
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that marriage enjoy special state protection.137  “In 1979, the Bundesverfassungsgericht [the 
federal constitutional court] defined marriage in this sense as “the union of a man and a 
woman.”138  Unless there is a Constitutional amendment, that provision prohibits same-sex 
marriages because they would violate the special state protection.139  Legal challenges were 
brought, arguing “that allowing same-sex partnerships would damage the legal fundaments of 
marriage.”140  The court disagreed, finding that marriage’s legal foundation was unchanged by 
partnership law.141  As a result, in 2005, new partnership law abolished many of the remaining 
distinctions between marriage and partnerships, allowing for marital property, alimony, divorce, 
pension rights and step-child adoption.142  Thus, it was not the German separation of civil and 
religious marriage that resulted in rights for same-sex couples, but the ability to create 
partnerships that give the rights of marriage without the terminology.  Because the label of 
marriage is so important,143 the German model of separation is limited because it does not extend 
civil marriage to same-sex couples.144 
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VI. Conclusion 
Separation of religious and civil marriage could be difficult.  Separating church and state 
usually is, especially considering how much influence religion has on many people’s everyday 
life.  One need only look at the history of law and religion in this country and the convoluted 
state of Establishment Clause and Free Exercise jurisprudence to see how difficult it has been to 
walk the line between the establishment of religion and limitations on the free exercise of 
religion.  What often appears as establishment to one feels like free exercise to another.  The 
tension between establishment and free exercise exists in the very language of the Constitution.  
But, regardless of how difficult finding the line is, the language requires the judiciary to find one.  
The current United States marriage system violates the First Amendment.  There are potentially 
many solutions.  This proposal is merely one which addresses and rectifies the Establishment 
Clause violation without creating Free Exercise issues.  Change is rarely easy.  But in this case, it 
is required. 
